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Abstract 
 
This paper is founded on the growing need to eradicate corruption in the society. The causes and effects of corruption, 
and how to combat it, are issues that are on the increase on national, regional and international agenda. The United 
Nations Convention against Corruption, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the United Nations Declaration against Corruption 
and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions, and the International Code of Conduct for Public Officials are 
living testimonies. These calls to eradicate corruption present puzzles that scholarly investigations need to take lead 
role and centre stage in unravelling them. This scenario appeals for both theoretical and practical discourse, which is 
the root foundation of this paper. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Unprecedented efforts have been made to raise awareness about corruption, its insidious nature and the damaging 
effects it has on the welfare of entire nations and their peoples. As Bardhan (1997) noted, corruption not only distorts 
economic decision-making, it also deters investment, undermines competitiveness and, ultimately, weakens economic 
growth. Indeed, according to Johnston (1997), there is evidence that the social, legal, political and economic aspects of 
development are all linked, and that corruption in any one sector impedes development in them all. As observed by 
Heidenheimer and Michael (2002), there is now increasing recognition throughout the public and private sector that 
corruption is a serious obstacle to effective government, economic growth and stability. Consequently, in the mind of Njui 
(n.d) anti-corruption policies and legislations are urgently required at the national and international level.  
This paper presents a critical analysis and an appraisal of anti-corruption initiatives through a reflection of the 
strategies used by the defunct Kenya Anti-corruption Commission. The paper shows the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption 
initiatives by underscoring the changing character of corruption and the failures of various initiatives towards its 
eradication. 
 
2. Corruption: A definition 
 
The term “corruption” is used as a shorthand reference for a large range of illicit or illegal activities. Although there is no 
universal or comprehensive definition as to what constitutes corrupt behaviour, the most prominent definitions share a 
common emphasis upon the abuse of public power or position for personal advantage. The Oxford Unabridged Dictionary 
(2002) defines corruption as perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favour 
while Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (2006) defines corruption as inducement to wrong by improper or unlawful 
means (as bribery). 
The succinct definition utilized by the World Bank (1997) is: “the abuse of public office for private gain.” This 
definition is similar to that employed by Transparency International (TI 2006), the leading NGO in the global anticorruption 
effort, it (TI) maintains that corruption involves behaviour on the part of officials in the public sector, whether politicians or 
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civil servants, in which they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, or those close to them, by the misuse of the 
public power entrusted to them. 
Muthomi (2006) argued that the conception of corruption varies among scholars. The narrowest understanding of 
corruption sees the vice as the abuse of public office for private gain.  Muthomi noted that broadly defined, corruption is 
the abuse of not only public office but also private or commercial office for private gain. It invariably involves giving 
something to someone in a position of power either in government or in a corporation, so that he will (ab)use his power 
and act in a manner favouring the giver. It involves the offering, giving, soliciting or acceptance of an inducement or 
reward, which may influence the action of any person. (Muthomi, 2006:2) 
 According to Ruhiu (n.d), definition of corruption depends on one’s own experience. However, whichever way one 
looks at it, it is a moral disease that permeates all the levels of the society. According to Procter (1980), corruption is a 
behaviour that is not honest or legal by people in official positions. Van Tulden, Frank, and Abraham van der Torre (1997) 
observed that there is no single, comprehensive, universally accepted definition of corruption. Attempts to develop such a 
definition invariably encounter legal, criminological and, in many countries, political problems. Indeed, this observation is 
well illustrated by the efforts of the UN to define corruption. According to Monica (2004) when the negotiations of the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption began in early 2002, one option under consideration was not to define 
corruption at all but to list specific types or acts of corruption. Monica observed that proposals to require countries to 
criminalize corruption mainly covered specific offences or groups of offences that depended on what type of conduct was 
involved, whether those implicated were public officials, whether cross-border conduct or foreign officials were involved, 
and if the cases related to unlawful or improper enrichment (Monica, 2004:66).  
According to Kenya Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 corruption means an offence that involves 
bribery, fraud, embezzlement or misappropriation of public funds, abuse of office, breach of trust; or an offence involving 
dishonesty- in connection with any tax, rate or impost levied under any Act; or under any written law relating to the 
elections of persons to public office; (The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003:4f). 
What emerges from the attempts to define corruption as reviewed above is that there seems to be no knowledge of 
what really corruption is. In fact as it emerges from the the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003, in Kenya, 
corruption is synonymous with bribery, embezzlement or any such action as contained in the Act.  This implies that anti-
corruption initiatives are being directed towards something unknown. This paper henceforth notes that lack of conceptual 
clarity, could perhaps be one cause for the supposed failed attempts to fight corruption.  
 
3. Forms of Corruption 
 
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) argued that corruption is well understood through its forms. They noted that many 
specific forms of corruption are clearly defined and understood, and are the subject of numerous legal or academic 
definitions. Miller (2001) agreed with Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) and added that many of the forms of corruption 
are criminal offences, although in some cases Governments consider that specific forms of corruption are better dealt 
with by regulatory or civil law controls.  
Muthomi (2006) argued that Corruption manifests itself in one or more of various forms, viz. bribery, extortion, 
fraud, embezzlement and other forms of malfeasance by public or corporate officials. He maintained that though universal 
in its existence, the pervasiveness of corruption varies across nations and organizations. Corruption occurs in different 
forms, in different types of organizations and at different levels. Typologies of corruption include Grand Corruption, 
Political Corruption, Corporate Corruption, Administrative Corruption and Petty Corruption. Petty corruption is the 
common man’s version of corruption. It is said that petty corruption involves small sums paid to low-level officials to 
"grease the wheels" or cut through bureaucratic red tape (Muthomi, 2006: 4). This section discusses in detail, some of the 
forms of corruption mentioned in this paragraph as follows. 
 
Grand and Petty Corruption 
 
According to TI (207), Grand corruption is corruption that pervades the highest levels of a national Government, leading 
to a broad erosion of confidence in good governance, the rule of law and economic stability. Petty corruption can involve 
the exchange of very small amounts of money, the granting of minor favours by those seeking preferential treatment or 
the employment of friends and relatives in minor positions (TI). The most critical difference between grand corruption and 
petty corruption is that the former involves the distortion or corruption of the central functions of Government, while the 
latter develops and exists within the context of established governance and social frameworks. 
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Active and Passive Corruption 
 
Rose-Ackerman (1999) argued that in discussions of transactional offences such as bribery, "active bribery" usually 
refers to the offering or paying of the bribe, while "passive bribery” refers to the receiving of the bribe. In criminal law 
terminology, the terms may be used to distinguish between a particular corrupt action and an attempted or incomplete 
offence. For example, "active" corruption would include all cases where payment and/or acceptance of a bribe had taken 
place. According to UN (2004), it does not include cases where a bribe was offered but not accepted, or solicited but not 
paid. In the formulation of comprehensive national anti-corruption strategies that combine criminal justice with other 
elements, such distinctions are less critical. Nevertheless, care should be taken to avoid confusion between the two 
concepts. 
 
Bribery 
 
Simis (1982) argued that bribery is the bestowing of a benefit in order to unduly influence an action or decision. It can be 
initiated by a person who seeks or solicits bribes or by a person who offers and then pays bribes. Anechiarico and Jacobs 
(1998) noted that bribery is probably the most common form of corruption known. Definitions or descriptions appear in 
several international instruments, in the domestic laws of most countries and in academic publications. The "benefit" in 
bribery can be virtually any inducement: money and valuables, company shares, inside information, sexual or other 
favours, entertainment, employment or, indeed, the mere promise of incentives. The benefit may be passed directly or 
indirectly to the person bribed, or to a third party, such as a friend, relative, associate, favourite charity, private business, 
political party or election campaign (Anechiarico &Jacobs, 1998:78).  
According to Ades & Di Tella (1997), the conduct for which the bribe is paid can be active: the exertion of 
administrative or political influence or it can be passive: the overlooking of some offence or obligation. Bribes can be paid 
individually on a case-by-case basis or as part of a continuing relationship in which officials receive regular benefits in 
exchange for regular favours. Ades & Di Tella maintained that in jurisdictions where criminal bribery necessarily involves 
a public official, the offence is often defined broadly to extend to private individuals offered bribes to influence their 
conduct in a public function, such as exercising electoral functions or carrying out jury duty (Ades & Di Tella, 1997: 38). 
Baker (2005) holds that public sector bribery can target any individual who has the power to make a decision or take an 
action affecting others and is willing to resort to bribery to influence the outcome. Politicians, regulators, law enforcement 
officials, judges, prosecutors and inspectors are all potential targets for public sector bribery.  
Provisions that define or criminalize bribery include: article 8 of the UN Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime, GA/Res/55/25, Annex and article VI of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption of 29 March 
1996 (OAS Convention), which require Parties to criminalize offering of or acceptance by a public official of an undue 
advantage in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of the official's public functions. Article 1 of the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and Article VIII of the 
OAS Convention require Parties to criminalize the offering of bribes by nationals of one State to a Government official of 
another in conjunction with a business transaction. 
Articles 2 and 3 of the European Union Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the 
European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union, Journal C 195, 25/06/1997, pp.2- 11 (1997), 
requires Parties to criminalize the request or receipt by a public official of any advantage or benefit in exchange for the 
official's action or omission in the exercise of his functions ("passive bribery"), as well as the promise or giving of any 
such advantage or benefit to a public official ("active bribery"). The Council of Europe's Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption, ETS No. 173 (1998), goes further by criminalizing "active" and "passive" bribery of, inter alia, domestic public 
officials, foreign public officials, domestic and foreign public assemblies, as well as private sector bribery, trading in 
influence and account offences.  
 
Embezzlement, Theft and Fraud 
 
As noted by Ferrero and Brosio (1997), in the context of corruption, embezzlement, theft and fraud all involve the taking 
or conversion of money, property or valuable items by an individual who is not entitled to them but, by virtue of his or her 
position or employment, has access to them. Hindess (2001), held that a number of recent international legal instruments 
have sought to ensure that Parties have offences addressing this type of conduct with varying degrees of specificity. 
These include the Organization of American States' Inter-American Convention against Corruption (1996) and the 
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European Union's Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the protection of 
the European Communities' financial interests (1995). Klitgaard, Ronald and Parris (2000) noted that as with bribery and 
other forms of corruption, many domestic and international legal definitions are intended to form the basis of criminal 
offences. Thus, they include only those situations involving a public official or where the public interest is crucially 
affected.  
According to the UN Anti-corruption Toolkit (2004), in some legal definitions "theft" is limited to the taking of 
tangible items, such as property or cash, but non-legal definitions tend to include the taking of anything of value, including 
intangibles such as valuable information. In the Toolkit, the broader meaning of "theft" is intended. Examples of corrupt 
theft, fraud and embezzlement abound. Virtually anyone responsible for storing or handling cash, valuables or other 
tangible property is in a position to steal it or to assist others in stealing it, particularly if auditing or monitoring safeguards 
are inadequate or non-existent. Employees or officials with access to company or Government operating accounts can 
make unauthorized withdrawals or pass to others the information required to do so. 
Brunetti and Weder (1998) held that elements of fraud are more complex. Officials may create artificial expenses; 
"ghost workers" may be added to payrolls or false bills submitted for goods, services, or travel expenses. The purchase 
or improvement of private real estate may be billed against public funds. Employment-related equipment, such as motor 
vehicles, may be used for private purposes. In one case, World Bank-funded vehicles were used for taking the children of 
officials to school, consuming about 25 per cent of their total use (World Bank, 1997).  
 
Extortion 
 
Ades and Di Tella (1997) observed that whereas bribery involves the use of payments or other positive incentives, 
extortion relies on coercion, such as the use or threat of violence or the exposure of damaging information, to induce 
cooperation. They (Ades and Di Tella, 1997) argue that as with other forms of corruption, the "victim" can be the public 
interest or individuals adversely affected by a corrupt act or decision. In extortion cases, however, a further "victim" is 
created, namely the person who is coerced into cooperation. While extortion can be committed by Government officials or 
insiders, such officials can also be victims of it.  
According to African Union (2003), the Union's Convention requires Parties to criminalize the use or presentation 
of false or incorrect representations or non-disclosure of information the effect of which is the misappropriation or 
wrongful retention of funds from the budget of the European Communities. The UN (2006) points out that officials in a 
position to initiate or conduct criminal prosecution or punishment often use the threat of prosecution or punishment as a 
basis for extortion. Alternatively, officials who have committed acts of corruption or other wrongdoings may be threatened 
with exposure unless they themselves pay up. Low-level extortion, such as the payment of "speed money" to ensure 
timely consideration and decision-making of minor matters by officials, is widespread in many countries. 
 
Abuse of Discretion 
 
According to Klitgaard, Ronald and Parris (2000) in some cases, corruption can involve the abuse of discretion, vested in 
an individual, for personal gain. For example, an official responsible for Government contracting may exercise the 
discretion to purchase goods or services from a company in which he or she holds a personal interest or propose real 
estate developments that will increase the value of personal property. Such abuse is often associated with bureaucracies 
where there is broad individual discretion and few oversight or accountability structures, or where decision making rules 
are so complex that they neutralize the effectiveness of any accountability structures that do exist. 
 
Favouritism, Nepotism and Clientelism 
 
Monica (2004) observed that generally, favouritism, nepotism and clientelism involve abuses of discretion. Such abuses, 
however, are governed not by the self-interest of an official but the interests of someone linked to him or her through 
membership of a family, political party, tribe, religious or other group. If an individual bribes an official to hire him or her, 
the official acts in self-interest. If a corrupt official hires a relative, he or she acts in exchange for the less tangible benefit 
of advancing the interests of family or the specific relative involved (nepotism). As Hopkins (2002) reported, the favouring 
of, or discriminating against, individuals can be based on a wide range of group characteristics: race, religion, 
geographical factors, political or other affiliation, as well as personal or organizational relationships, such as friendship or 
membership of clubs or associations. 
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Conduct Creating or Exploiting Conflicting Interests 
 
As noted in the United Nations Manual on Anti-corruption Policy (2004), most forms of corruption involve the creation or 
exploitation of some conflict between the professional responsibilities of a corrupt individual and his or her private 
interests. The acceptance of a bribe creates such a conflict of interest. Most cases of embezzlement, theft or fraud 
involve an individual yielding to temptation and taking undue advantage of a conflict of interest that already exists. In both 
the public and private sector, employees and officials are routinely confronted with circumstances in which their personal 
interests conflict with their responsibility that require them s to act in the best interests of the State or their employer. 
 
Improper Political Contributions 
 
According to Kimberly (1997), one of the most difficult challenges in developing anti-corruption measures is to make the 
distinction between legitimate contributions to political organizations and payments made in an attempt to unduly 
influence present or future activities by a party or its members once they are in power. A donation made because the 
donor supports the party and wishes to increase its chances of being elected is not corrupt; it may be an important part of 
the political system and, in some countries, is a basic right of expression or political activity protected by the constitution. 
A donation made with the intention or expectation that the party will, once in office, favour the interests of the donor over 
the interests of the public is tantamount to the payment of a bribe. 
Tanzi, and Ludger (1997) argued that regulating political contributions has proved difficult in practice. Donations 
may take the form of direct cash payments, low-interest loans, the giving of goods or services or intangible contributions 
that favour the interests of the political party involved. Tanzi, and Ludger further noted that one common approach to 
combating the problem is to introduce measures that seek to ensure transparency by requiring disclosure of 
contributions, thus ensuring that both the donor and recipient are politically accountable. Another is to limit the size of 
contributions to prevent any one donor from having too much influence (Tanzi & Ludger, 1997:34). 
As it is apparent from this section, corruption is a multifaceted behaviour, that is to say, it has many forms. This 
pseudopodal character as has been reviewed has made anti-corruption agencies to try and fight corruption from its forms. 
Accordingly therefore, the assumption seems to be that for example, when one stops bribery or extortion, then is stopping 
corruption. In mathematical theorization, this seems to rest on an assumption that the sum total of parts of a thing is equal 
to the thing. To what extend this assumption could be entertained rests a philosophical reflections. 
 
4. Causes of Corruption 
 
Without proper vigilance and effective countermeasures, corruption can occur anywhere. Recent corruption cases 
exposed in the World Bank (1997) and the United Nations (2004) have shown that any society or organization is 
susceptible, even where well established checks and balances are in place. Combating corruption, building integrity and 
establishing credibility require time, determination and consistency. When anti-corruption strategies are first instituted, a 
long-term process begins, during which corrupt values and practices are gradually identified and eliminated. In most 
cases, a complex process of interrelated elements is involved: reforms to individual institutions take place in stages as 
problems are identified; countermeasures are developed and implemented; personnel are reoriented and retrained.  
Corruption is generally connected with the activities of the state and especially with the monopoly and discretionary 
power of the state. Therefore, as Gary Becker, Nobel Laureate in economics, pointed out in one of his Business Week 
columns if we abolish the state, we abolish corruption. But, of course, quite apart from the fact that corruption can exist in 
the private sector, a civilized society cannot function without a state, and in modern, advanced societies, the state must 
have many functions (Becker & Stigler, 1974:74). The Becker argument seems to collide with the reality that some of the 
least corrupt countries in the world, such as Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden, have some of the 
largest public sectors, measured as shares of tax revenue or public spending in gross domestic product. Thus, the 
solution to the problem of corruption may not be as simple as just reducing the level of taxation or public spending. 
According to Miller (2001), the existence of these regulations and authorizations gives a kind of monopoly power to the 
officials who must authorize or inspect the activities. These officials may refuse the authorizations or may simply sit on a 
decision for months or even years. Thus, they can use their public power to extract bribes from those who need the 
authorizations or permits.  
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Taxation 
 
According to Tanzi (1998), corruption is likely to be a major problem in tax and customs administrations when the laws 
are difficult to understand and can be interpreted differently so that taxpayers need assistance in complying with them; 
the payment of taxes requires frequent contacts between taxpayers and tax administrators; the wages of the tax 
administrators are low; acts of corruption on the part of the tax administrators are ignored, not easily discovered, or when 
discovered penalized only mildly; the administrative procedures (e.g. the criteria for the selection of taxpayers for audits) 
lack transparency and are not closely monitored within the tax or customs administrations; tax administrators have 
discretion over important decisions, such as those related to the provision of tax incentives, determination of tax liabilities, 
selection of audits, litigations, and so on; and more broadly, the controls from the state (the principal) on the agents 
charged with carrying out its functions are weak (Tanzi, 1998:64ff). 
According to Kpundeh (2006) in some countries, at one time, corruption became so endemic in the tax 
administration (e.g., Peru and Uganda) that the government decided to close down the existing administrations and to 
replace them by new ones. In several countries, customs administrations have been very corrupt, leading to the jailing of 
the director of customs and in several cases resulting in the replacement of the domestic customs organizations with the 
services of foreign companies. 
 
Provision for Goods and Services at Below-Market Prices  
 
Rauch and Peter (1997) observed that in most countries, the government engages in the provision of goods, services, 
and resources at below-market prices for example, foreign exchange, credit, electricity, water, public housing, some 
rationed goods, access to educational and health facilities, access to public land, and so on. Even access to some forms 
of pensions, such as those for disability, fall into this category because the individuals who get them have paid less in 
contributions to the pension funds over time than the pension they get once their disability status is approved. In some 
countries, disability pensions have been a fertile ground for corruption. In others, some individuals benefited enormously 
when they were able to get access to large amounts of credit or foreign exchange at below-market prices. Rauch and 
Evans argued that sometimes, because of limited supply, rationing or queuing becomes unavoidable. Excess demand is 
created and decisions have to be made to apportion the limited supply. These decisions are often made by public 
employees. Those who want these goods (the users) would be willing to pay a bribe to get access (or a higher access) to 
what the government is providing. It is thus not surprising that in all the areas mentioned above, cases of corruption have 
been reported (Rauch and Peter, 1997: 32). 
Decisions such as those described above are often worth a lot to individuals or enterprises. Theobald (1990) 
argued that it is natural that attempts will be made by some of them to get favourable decisions, in some cases by paying 
bribes and in other cases by simply exploiting close personal relations with public officials.  He held that the bribes may 
be paid to public officials whose salaries may be very low and whose “temptation price” may be far less than the value of 
the potential benefit from a favourable decision to the bribers (Theobald, 1990:24).  
 
Levels of the Bureaucracy 
 
The quality of the bureaucracy varies greatly among countries. In some, public sector jobs give a lot of prestige and 
status; in others, much less so. Many factors contribute to that quality. Many years ago Max Weber (1947), the 
outstanding German sociologist, described what should be the characteristics of an ideal bureaucracy. Tradition and the 
effect that it has on the pride that individuals have in working for the government may explain why, all things being equal, 
some bureaucracies are much more efficient and much less vulnerable to corruption than others. Rauch and Peter (1997) 
have gathered information on the degree to which civil servants’ recruitment and promotions are merit based for 35 
developing countries. Their results indicate that the less recruitment and promotion are based on merit, the higher is the 
extent of corruption. Rauch and Evans concluded that absence of politically motivated hiring, patronage, and nepotism, 
and clear rules on promotions and hiring, in addition to some of the factors discussed separately below, all contribute to 
the quality of a bureaucracy (Rauch & Peter, 1997:56).  
 
Level of Public Sector Wages 
 
Over the years many observers have speculated that the wages paid to civil servants are important in determining the 
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degree of corruption. For example, Assar Lindbeck (1998) attributes the low corruption in Sweden in this century partly to 
the fact that at the turn of the century, high-level administrators earned 12–15 times the salary of an average industrial 
worker. Assar Lindbeck says that one can speculate that there may be corruption due to greed and corruption due to 
need. The higher the wage level, the lower is corruption (Assar Lindbeck, 1998:67). The relationship between wage level 
and corruption index has been tested empirically by Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997). In other words, the fight against 
corruption, pursued exclusively on the basis of wage increases, can be very costly to the budget of a country and can 
achieve only part of the objective. Furthermore, as argued above, even at high wages some individuals may continue to 
engage in corrupt practices. 
 
Impact of Corruption 
 
Many scholars have identified several effects of corruption. Kibwana (2001) observed that corruption tends to concentrate 
wealth, not only increasing the gap between rich and poor but providing the wealthy with illicit means to protect their 
positions and interests. Kibwana held that, in turn, can contribute to social conditions that foster other forms of crime, 
social and political instability and even terrorism. Corruption can be found in all walks of life. It hinders economic 
development, diverts investments in infrastructure, institutions and social services and also undermines efforts to achieve 
other country specific targets (Kibwana, 2001: 63). 
Braguinsky (1996) argued that whereas corruption may often occur in private, its implications for society in general 
are grave and this must form the basis for the unyielding response against it. Braguinsky maintains that Irrespective of 
the perpetrators of corruption, there are costs borne by society, which is the basis for the refusal to tolerate it. Principally, 
corruption harms society and the economy by diverting resources towards less deserving people. In this manner the more 
deserving within the economy are short-changed. For instance due to corruption, resources may be allocated without 
considerations of priority and where the returns may be optimised (Braguinsky, 1996: 34f).  
As Mbula (2008) notes examples of the effects of corruption where resources are not optimally used are numerous 
in Kenya and do involve claims of favouritism of some people or even regions at the expense of others. In this regard 
Mbula cautioned that If this occurs again and again, the people or institutions that are capable of contributing to growth 
are stifled (Mbula, 2008: 5). Crank and Caldero (2004) ccorruption is harmful to a society and the economy since its effect 
is equivalent to taxing honest work and instead rewarding mediocrity and dishonesty. As such, genuine hardworking 
people are demotivated since merit ceases to be the basis of reward. Crank and Caldero observed that the competitive 
edge in institutions and people, which is essential to good service, is replaced by competition in corrupt practices and this 
distorts the nature of any market, and in turn the policies that govern such markets. A common argument heard in 
business circles is that survival is impossible without competition (Crank and Caldero, 2004: 123). 
According to Kaufmann and Siegelbaum (1996), where corruption is perverse, injustice is perpetrated because 
those with an unethical orientation get privileged access to resources and services to which others are excluded. It is in 
this regard that Kaufmann and Siegelbaum held that this aggravates social injustice and increases poverty while this 
social and economic exclusion translates into class disharmony. Exclusion maintaining the tensions increases to the 
extent that the whole society is under structural strain. Societies in which exclusion is reinforced by corruption do 
experience instability that may result in violence and massive destruction. Finally, at the purely commercial level, 
corruption does discourage investments because it raises substantially the transaction costs in the conduct of business. 
Due to the additional cost, the goods and services procured through the corruption process are uncompetitive (Kaufmann 
and Siegelbaum, 1996:65). 
Klitgaard (1991) observed that corruption has severe implications for the economy because it causes a gradual 
depression in the investments as the costs contingent to corruption cut down on the expected returns. Businesses then 
withdraw to places or countries where there is an atmosphere more conducive to investment. Klitgaard emphasized that 
the prime consequence to the economy is that corruption does cause the loss of investment, both local and foreign. Since 
no rational investor will knowingly establish a business in a corrupt country, the need to deal decisively with this problem 
is imperative (…) (Klitgaard, 1991:47). 
 
5. Actions against Corruption 
 
As KACC (2008) notes, efforts towards capacity building to combat corruption are still believed to be in their infancy in 
most countries, and reliable information about the nature and extent of domestic and transnational corruption is difficult to 
obtain. The problems of corruption are compounded by the very broad nature of the phenomenon and lack of consensus 
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about legal or criminological definitions that could form the basis of international and comparative research. According to 
the United Nations (2001), corruption can be found in all walks of life. It hinders economic development, diverts 
investments in infrastructure, institutions and social services and also undermines efforts to achieve other country specific 
targets. As a result, the UN notes that the international community has become increasingly concerned with the problem 
of corruption and its negative impact on economic growth and poverty alleviation (UN, 2001:112).  
As World Bank (1997) points out development partners, international organizations, non-governmental 
organizations and academic experts on corruption have advocated for an integrated and comprehensive approach to 
fighting corruption around the globe. This includes: introducing new or amended legislation aimed at reducing public 
officials’ opportunities for rent-seeking; building alliances with other governments in the struggle against corruption by 
signing international anti-corruption agreements; and the implementation of anti-corruption programmes. 
Action against corruption is high on the global agenda and anti-corruption efforts by the international community 
have led to the establishment of global and regional initiatives to fight corruption. Among them are the UN Convention 
against Corruption; the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption; the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime; the UN Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial 
Transactions; and the International Code of Conduct for Public Officials.  
The United Nations Convention against Corruption, finalised on 30 September 2003 and adopted by the General 
Assembly in its resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003, represents a major step forward in the global fight against corruption, 
and in particular in the efforts of UN Member States to develop a common approach to both domestic efforts and 
international cooperation.  Through the  Convention the UN urges all States and competent regional economic integration 
organizations to sign and ratify the United Nations Convention against Corruptions soon as possible in order to ensure its 
rapid entry into force (UN, 2004:1f). 
The UN Convention can be seen as the most recent of a long series of developments in which experts have 
recognised the far-reaching impact of corruption and the need to develop effective measures against it at both the 
domestic and international levels. It is now widely accepted that measures to address corruption go beyond criminal 
justice systems and are essential to establishing and maintaining the most fundamental good governance structures, 
including domestic and regional security, the rule of law and social and economic structures which are effective and 
responsive in dealing with problems, and which use available resources as efficiently and with as little waste as possible.  
The gradual understanding of both the scope and seriousness of the problem of corruption can be seen in the 
evolution of international action against it, which has progressed from general consideration and declarative statements, 
to the formulation of practical advice, and then to the development of binding legal obligations and the emergence of 
numerous cases in which countries have sought the assistance of one another in the investigation and prosecution of 
corruption cases and the pursuit of proceeds. The States Parties to this Convention agreed  to promote and strengthen 
measures to prevent and combat corruption more efficiently and effectively; to promote, facilitate and support 
international cooperation and technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against corruption, including asset 
recovery and to promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and public property (UN, 2003: 
5ff). 
The Convention in its Preventive measurescontains a compendium of preventive measures which goes far beyond 
those of previous instruments in both scope and detail, reflecting the importance of prevention and the wide range of 
specific measures which have been identified by experts in recent years. Specific requirements include the establishment 
of specialized procedures and bodies to develop domestic prevention measures; private-sector prevention measures; 
measures directed at general prevention in the public sector as well as at specific critical areas such as public 
procurement and financial management and the judiciary; and measures to prevent money-laundering. 
The Convention calls on States Parties to establish or maintain a series of specific criminal offences including not 
only long-established crimes such as various forms of bribery and embezzlement, but also conduct which may not 
already be criminalised in many States, such as trading in official influence and other abuses of official functions. This has 
proven a powerful anticorruption instrument in the hands of many States, but would be impossible for others to implement 
because of constitutional or legal requirements, particularly those regarding the presumption of innocence. 
Other measures found in the Convention include offences relating to obstruction of justice (Art.25) and money 
laundering (Art.23), the establishment of jurisdiction to prosecute (Art.42), the seizing, freezing and confiscation of 
proceeds or other property (Art.31), protection of witnesses, experts and victims and others (Art.32-33), other matters 
relating to investigations and prosecutions (Art.36- 41), and the requirement that some form of civil, criminal or 
administrative liability must be established for legal persons (Art.26). The Convention emphasizes international 
cooperation as basic in the fight against corruption and calls for the extradition of offenders, mutual legal assistance and 
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less-formal forms of cooperation in the course of investigations and other law-enforcement activities. Consequently, 
offenders may be extradited without dual criminality where this is permitted by the law of the requested State Party. The 
underlying rule, applicable to all forms of cooperation, is that where dual-criminality is required, it must be based on the 
fact that the relevant States Parties have criminalised the conduct underlying an offence, and not whether the actual 
offence provisions coincide. 
Through AUCPCC, the member states agreed to promote and strengthen the development in Africa by each State 
Party, of mechanisms required to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in the public and 
private sectors. Promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation among the State Parties to ensure the effectiveness of 
measures and actions to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in Africa. Coordinate and 
harmonize the policies and legislation between State Parties for the purposes of prevention, detection, punishment and 
eradication of corruption on the continent. Promote socio-economic development by removing obstacles to the enjoyment 
of economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights. Establish the necessary conditions to foster 
transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs (AU, 2003:1). 
 
6. Anti-corruption Legislation in Kenya 
 
The Prevention of Corruption Act Cap.65 of 1956 
 
Anti-corruption initiatives and establishment of related institutions in Kenya can be traced back to The Prevention of 
Corruption Act (Cap.65 of 1956). The Act was primarily to be enforced by the Police Department. Despite its existence, 
corruption grew over the years. Efforts were made to establish an Anti-corruption squad within the Criminal Investigation 
Department of the Kenya Police, but the squad was disbanded before it could have any significant impact. The Act was 
amended in 1987 to provide for the establishment of the Kenya Anti-corruption Authority (KACA) to fight corruption, taking 
this function away from the police. Its formation was a tacit admission of the problem of corruption in Kenya at that time. 
According to Kibwana and Akivaga (2001), KACA investigated and proceeded to prosecute a number of public officials 
alleged to have engaged in corrupt practices as defined by the Act.  
Part 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap.65 of 1956) and subsequent amendments established the Kenya 
Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Board to work with the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA). The principal 
functions of the board were to advise KACA on the exercise of its powers under the Act, and to approve the acceptance 
of grants and donations to KACA. The Economic Crimes Court was also established under the Prevention of Corruption 
Act Cap.65 of 1956 and subsequent amendments. It exercised unlimited jurisdiction in respect of crimes under the Act 
itself. The Act vested power in KACA’s officers to conduct investigations, obtain information necessary for presentation 
before the court, effect arrest for offences under the Act, and intercept private information upon an ex parte application to 
the court. However, in December 2000 (High Court of Kenya 2003), the High Court in the case of Gachiengo vs. Republic 
(2000) ruled that the existence of KACA undermined the powers conferred on both the Attorney General and the 
Commissioner of Police by the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya. Consequently, KACA was disbanded. 
 
The Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Act 2003 
 
The object of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act 2003 was to provide for the prevention, investigation and 
punishment of corruption, economic crimes and related offences and incidental matters. The Act embodied a broad 
conception of corruption viz. bribery, fraud, embezzlement or misappropriation of public funds, abuse of office, and 
breach of trust or an offence involving dishonesty in connection with any tax, rate or impost levied under any Act 
(Republic of Kenya 2003, Section 45). 
Part II of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act 2003 provided for the appointment of special magistrates 
with exclusive jurisdiction to try offences specified in the Act. They were obliged, as far as was practicable, to hold the 
trial of an offence under the Act on a day-to-day basis until completion. Part III A of the Act established the Kenya Anti-
Corruption Commission (KACC) as the premier institution for fighting corruption in the country, vested with a wide 
mandate to investigate corrupt conduct, trace and recover corruptly acquired public property, devise corruption prevention 
mechanisms and educate the public on the dangers of corruption. Part III B established the Kenya Anti-corruption’ 
Commission Advisory Board as a corporate body independent and answerable only to Parliament. The Board was to 
advise the Kenya Anti-Corruption commission generally on the exercise of its powers and the performance of its functions 
under the Act. Further, it was to recommend to parliament persons to be appointed and/or removed from office as 
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Director and Assistant Directors of the Commission, and to approve grants and donations to the Commission.However, 
on August 24th 2011, Parliament passed the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2011, effectively repealing the 
Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Act 2003, thereby disbanding the Kenya Anti-corruption Commission. 
 
The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2011 
 
Pursuant to Article 79 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) was 
established by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act No.22 of 2011 (Republic of Kenya 2011). The Act 
mandates the Commission to, inter alia,  develop and promote standards and best practices in integrity and anti-
corruption; oversee the enforcement of codes of ethics prescribed for public officers; monitor the enforcement of codes of 
conducts of members of professional bodies established under any law;  advise, on its own initiative, any person on any 
matter within its functions; raise public awareness on ethical issues, educate the public on the dangers of corruption, and 
enlist and foster public support in combating corruption ; work with other State and public offices in the development and 
promotion of standards and best practices in integrity and anti-corruption measures, and receive complaints on the 
breach of the code of ethics by a public officer. The Act further provides that the Commission shall investigate and 
recommend to the Director of Public Prosecutions the prosecution of any acts of corruption or violation of codes of ethics 
or other matters prescribed under this Act or any other law enacted pursuant to Chapter Six of the Constitution.  
 
7. The Defunct Kenya Anti-corruption’ Commission 
 
In 2003, the Kenya Government published the Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003, which led to the 
establishment of Kenya Anti-corruption Commission, the main government statutory agency mandated to fight corruption 
in Kenya. Under section 5, the Act establishes the Commission. The Act provided that (1) The Kenya Anti-Corruption 
Commission is hereby established as a body corporate. (2) The Commission shall have all the powers necessary or 
expedient for the performance of its functions. (3) Without limiting the generality of subsection (2), the Commission shall 
have perpetual succession and a common seal and shall be capable of-(a) suing and being sued in its corporate name; 
and (b) holding and alienating moveable and immovable property (Kenya Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 
2003:9f). The Commission begun to implement its functions through a three-pronged approach of Enforcement, 
Prevention and Public Education as an articulation of its mandate spelt out in the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes 
Act, 2003. The Constitutional establishment of KACC as a legal body to deal with incidences of corruption is an official 
admission that corruption is a serious problem in Kenya.   
Despite the initiatives that were undertaken by KACC, several reports show that there was no reduction in 
incidences of corruption in Kenya. According to Transparency International (2006), Kenya remained in the bottom 10% of 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), an indicator that Kenya was one of the world’s most 
corrupt countries. Indeed, Kenya was ranked 144th out of 159 countries for corruption. It was estimated that the average 
urban Kenyan paid 16 bribes per month. Kanyinga (2004) notes that anti-corruption initiatives in Kenya seem to bear 
insignificant fruits. As Kivutha and Oketch-Owiti (2005) observed, this poor performance of public institutions has made 
many citizens to be very sceptical of the various initiatives aimed at addressing corruption.  Indeed, in introductory 
message (2007), the by then Director of the defunct KACC, Aaron Ringera mentioned that perception by the public of the 
work of KACC was a challenge. The public seemed not satisfied by the work of the Commission and even felt that the 
Commission targeted people who were less powerful (report referred to this as “Small fish” and “Big fish).  
 
8. Corruption Trends in Kenya as of the Year 2010 
 
According to Ringera (2007), more often than not, information about the incidence of corruption remains a matter of 
speculation and conjecture. “(…) this scenario not withstanding however, it is still possible for a keen observer to 
authoritatively postulate about the trends of corruption in Kenya in terms of its occurrence, manifestation, frequency and 
intensity (…)” (Ringera, 2007:16).  On the basis of this observation, it would not be idle to assert that corruption is very 
much alive in Kenyan Society today. 
As Muthomi (2006) puts it, the bottom line therefore is that while acts of corruption are no longer brazenly executed 
with impunity as in the past, the perpetrators of this vice are becoming more adept and sophisticated in their schemes. 
Ringera (2007) notes that more often than not, as recent experiences show, the corrupt are now investing time and 
resources to cover their tracks upfront before carrying out their activities. The cover up may take the form of socializing 
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law enforcement agencies in the corrupt ventures or establishing an elaborate and intricate network of defence in the 
event that the cover is blown and demands for punitive action against the perpetrator become the norm of the day.  
Ringera’s observations over the efforts to cover up corruption compares to the arguments advanced by Bellow 
(2003), who argued that the strategy is what has in recent times been characterized as the ability of corruption to fight 
back where attempts to slay the dragon do give rise to even more dangerous beasts. Bellow (ibid), observed that this 
near impenetrable web of defence can take a social, political or legal form or a combination of all the three. The social 
strategy entails acts of largesse directed to an unsuspecting or gullible public by the barons and cartels of corruption. 
Once as often happens, a corrupt individual succeeds in portraying himself as the benefactor of society, it becomes very 
difficult for state agencies to unmask him as a social thief and therefore an enemy of the people (Bellow, 2003:67). 
As Namwamba (2007) argues on the political front, the line of defence takes the form of an appeal to tribal or 
ethnic emotions by the corrupt. According to KACC (2007), one of the most coveted instruments of self-protection, which 
has over the years been deployed with devastating effect against the anti-corruption war in Kenya, is the tendency for the 
corrupt to portray themselves as victims of a tribal witch-hunt. KACC notes that the strategy by would be convicts to 
ethicize their own criminality has on many occasions succeeded in blackmailing those with the responsibility of enforcing 
the law into inaction (KACC, 2007:6).  
Finally, law itself is almost invariably deployed as the last bulwark against the anti-corruption war. As Ringera 
(2007) notes, law in this regard is not just an instrument of social engineering but also a vehicle of maintaining the status 
quo. It becomes a tool for preserving the benefits and profits of corruption. In recent times lawyers have directed most of 
their energies towards the defence of those indicted of corruption on the basis that fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the individual are under threat. Rengera (2007) says that: “lest these last remarks be misconstrued as pouring scorn on 
the due process of law, let me make it absolutely clear that he is a firm believer in the rule of law. People should be 
punished only in accordance with the law. But when the law becomes an impediment to the achievement of social justice 
by offering sanctuary to those who unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the public, then it ought to be changed to 
pave way for better laws. In addition, those whose sacred duty it is to interpret and enforce the law must be alive to the 
perpetual imperative of attuning legal procedures and processes towards facilitating quick detection, prosecution and 
punishment of corrupt conduct” (Ringera, 2007:x).  
KACC conducted a survey that measured perceived corruption and compared the outcome with the findings of the 
2005 and 2006 surveys. The 2007 Survey was carried out during the months of August and September 2007 involving 
5,207 respondents spread across the country. The highlights of the survey findings show that more than three quarters of 
the respondents (77.9%) understood corruption to mean giving and taking bribes. Other manifestations of corruption 
recognized include misuse of public resources, tribalism/nepotism/favouritism, extortion, fraud, illegal acquisition of public 
property and tax evasion. Over three quarters of the respondents (77.6%) perceive corruption to be a major problem 
today while nearly all respondents (91.8% and 83%) believe that “grand” and “petty” corruption respectively is very 
harmful to the economy (KACC, 2008:69). 
According to the survey (KACC, 2008), on average, 44 percent of the respondents indicated that corruption level 
within public institutions has decreased, 34.3 percent believe it has increased, while 16 percent felt it has not changed. 
Respondents perceived the Police (Traffic, Regular and Administration) and the Provincial Administration to top the list of 
public agencies most involved in bribery. GovernmentHospitals, Local Authorities, National Registration Bureau, Lands 
Office, the Judiciary and Department of Immigration were also perceived as dens of corruption.  
 
9. KACC Strategies in the Fight against Corruption: A critical Overview 
 
The defunct Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission was the premier institution for fighting corruption in the country. It was 
established by law (The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act 2003) and vested with a wide mandate to investigate 
corrupt conduct, trace and recover corruptly acquired public property, devise corruption prevention mechanisms and 
educate the public on the dangers of corruption. The Commission adopted an all embracing and comprehensive strategy 
of executing this mission. The Commission used a three-pronged approach in the fight against corruption. These were: 
investigation, prevention, and mobilization of public support (Public Education). This approach was reflected in the 
mandate given to the Commission by law to investigate corrupt conduct; trace and recover corruptly acquired public 
property, advice on corruption prevention mechanisms and educate the public on the dangers of corruption. This 
mandate was carried out through three Directorates: The Directorate of Investigations and Asset Tracing; the Directorate 
of Legal Services and the Directorate of Preventive Services (Ringera, 2007: xi). 
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The Directorate of Preventive Services was responsible for the implementation of four functions of the Commission 
as spelt out in Section 7 of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (No. 3 of 2003). The section stated that at the 
request of any person, to advise and assist the person on ways in which the person may eliminate corrupt practices; to 
examine the practices and procedures of public bodies in order to facilitate the discovery of corrupt practices and to 
secure the revision of methods of work or procedures that in the opinion of the Commission, may be conducive to corrupt 
practices; to advise heads of public bodies of changes in practices or procedures compatible with the effective discharge 
of the duties of such bodies that the Commission thinks necessary to reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of corrupt 
practices and to educate the public on the dangers of corruption and economic crime and to enlist and foster public 
support in combating corruption and economic crime (Muthomi, 2006:13). 
Preventive activities therefore focused on reforming policies, practices, and procedures with a view to seal 
corruption loopholes and other inefficiencies that may lead to loss, poor service delivery and other malpractices. This 
approach, according to Christopher (2000) attempts to reach the majority of the population who, given an environment 
where ethical values and good governance practices are institutionalized, will not engage in corrupt practices. 
Christopher noted that this approach clearly differentiates prevention from investigation as the latter is mainly carried out 
after a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. The importance of corruption prevention cannot be 
underrated as it has been recognized internationally as the most effective strategy in fighting corruption (Christopher, 
2000: 113). 
As Muite (2007) argued, corruption loopholes exist in almost all management and operational systems in many 
organizations. Such loopholes may be found in the law, policies and procedures. For example, where the law vests 
certain individuals with discretionary powers, such powers may be abused if there is no system of checks and balances in 
exercising such discretion. According to KACC (2007) this overall strategy was largely defined by the legislative mandate 
given to the Commission by the Act. It was premised upon a vision of attaining a society with a zero tolerance for 
corruption. The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission realizes that the attainment of this vision entails a clear, systematic, 
practical, sustained and a well-coordinated approach to combating corruption. The Commission also realized that no 
single individual or agency could eradicate corruption in Kenya. The strategy was therefore three pronged i.e. 
enforcement of the law against corruption, prevention of corruption and educating the public about and against corruption 
(KACC, 2007:2). 
 
10. Law Enforcement (Investigation and Asset Tracing) 
 
The Commission was empowered to investigate any conduct constituting corruption or economic crime. It was also 
empowered to assist any law enforcement agency in the investigation of corruption or economic crime. Where an 
investigation revealed that loss of or damage to public property had been occasioned by the corrupt conduct of a public 
officer, the Commission was empowered to institute civil proceedings against such official for the recovery of the said 
property including but not limited to public funds. This power extended to all property or funds outside Kenya.   
The KACC Annual Report 2007/2009 makes it clear that one of the core mandates of the Commission was to 
conduct investigations into corruption and economic crimes and related matters reported to or detected by the 
Commission. The Commission placed more emphasis on proactive diction of corruption and economic crimes to disrupt 
corrupt activities. This pre-emptive approach saves the public money that would have otherwise been lost through 
corruption, dismantles corruption networks and saves on time and resources that would have been spent on post facto 
investigation and prosecution (KACC, 2008:4).In pursuing of its law enforcement through investigation and asset tracing 
initiatives, the Commission performed three main functions, namely, receiving reports, carrying out investigations, 
litigation and asset recovery. This section examines the performance of the Commission in these functions in detail as 
follows: 
 
Reports 
 
According to KACC 2007/2008 Annual Report, in the period July 2007 to June 2008 the Commission received 4,485 
complaints at the Commissions headquarters and a further 359 reports at the Mombasa regional office which became 
operational in June 2007. In comparison, the Commission received 8,188 reports in 2006-2007 and 7,888 reports in 
2005-2006 (KACC, 2006 & 2007). However, the KACC 2007/2007 Annual Report noted that the drop in the number of 
reports received may be attributed to two main reasons, namely: General Elections campaigns which witnessed 
increased political activity in the period September to December 2007, and Post Election violence covering the months of 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
        Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
            Published by MCSER-CEMAS-Sapienza University of Rome 
Vol 4 No 2 
May 2013 
 
 493 
January to March 2008 (KACC, 2008:4). It becomes apparent from this paragraph that the drop was not due to reduced 
cases of corruption, but that there was no access to reporting. Similarly, the view points to the fact that a drop in reported 
cases does not imply a reduction in corruption cases.  
 
Investigations 
 
During the period 2007/2008, the Commission completed 389 investigations, while 25 cases were referred to external 
agencies for investigations. These investigations according to KACC (2008) resulted in the arrest of 62 suspects. Some 
of the major investigations the Commission continued to undertake include: Security Contracts (Anglo Leasing Contracts) 
investigations. According to KACC (20008) the Commission continued to pursue international assistance through Mutual 
Legal Assistance and Agency to Agency cooperation in an endeavour to cover the international aspects but with varied 
successes and challenges. The Commission explained that these international investigations, through the assistance of 
foreign agencies, were covering jurisdictions including the United Kingdom, Spain, the United States, Jersey, Netherlands 
and Switzerland and extend to other jurisdictions as the investigation progresses (KACC, 20008:7). 
The Commission launched further investigations into Pending Bills, in which the Commission continued to receive 
reports from the Pending Bills Closing Committee with recommendations for criminal investigations and civil recovery. 
The Commission opened eighty (80) files with claims estimated at Kshs.80 billion. On the Judiciary, the Commission 
instituted five (5) inquiries targeting procurement and financial irregularities in the Judiciary involving senior officials of the 
Judiciary while at the National Aids Control Council, the Commission continued focus on the management of funds by the 
National Aids Control Council. Three (3) investigations on financial irregularities by officials and agents of the National 
Aids Control Council were instituted.  
KACC further reported that the Commission continued to focus attention on the usage of devolved funds and 
opened several inquiries on the use of Constituency Development Funds, the Local Authority Transfer Funds and the 
Fuel Levy. Investigations focused on the misuse of the funds by constituency development committees and 
parliamentarians, local authority staff and irregularities in the award and performance of road repair contracts through the 
use of fuel levy (KACC, 20008:7). Investigations continued in the sugar sector where the Commission managed, through 
intelligence gathered, to disrupt irregular payment of huge sums of money. Several other inquiries were ongoing. After 
incessant complaints by the public in regard to irregular issuance of work permits, residence permits and citizenship, the 
Commission instituted investigations at the Directorate of Immigration Services. (KACC, 20008:8). 
 
Asset Tracing Investigations 
 
In the year 2007-2008, 50 inquiry case files were opened. According to the KACC 2007/2008 Annual Report, some of the 
ongoing assets tracing investigations included investigation into allegations that a financial controller of a state 
corporation engaged in corruption /economic crimes and was in possession of unexplained assets. KACC mentioned that 
it was detected that the subject had suspect deposits amounting to over Kshs.128 million within one year. A search 
carried out in both the office and residence of the official recovered a total of Kshs.4, 308,000/= in cash. Valuation of his 
immovable assets was approximately Kshs.56 million (KACC, 20008:8). The KACC 2007/2008 Annual Report further 
reveals investigation into allegations that a chief accountant in a government ministry had accumulated wealth whose 
value is disproportionate to his known sources of income. In the report it is shown that a search carried out in the 
suspects residence recovered Kshs.1, 990,000/= in cash. Valuation of the unexplained assets was approximately 
Kshs.73.7 million (KACC, 20008:8). 
Other issues covered the investigation into allegations that the Nucleus Estate of Miwani Sugar Company (1989) 
Limited (under receivership) which comprises of 9,394 acres of land and developments thereon with an estimated value 
of over Kshs.2.3 billion was irregularly disposed of through a public auction, Investigation into allegation of illegal 
acquisition of public land in Mombasa estimated at Kshs.5 million and investigation into allegations that the Kenya Sugar 
Board made irregular payments in the form of legal fees to the tune of Kshs.181 million to an advocate. 
 
Proactive Interventions by the Commission 
 
According (KACC,20008).the Commission undertook the following preemptive actions: Kenya Sugar Board, in which the 
Commission detected and proactively disrupted a transaction involving Kenya Sugar Board in which Kshs.2.2 billion was 
about to be irregularly approved and granted to a non-qualified applicant. Mombasa Old Port, where a tax evasion ring at 
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the Mombasa Old Port in which unscrupulous traders evaded taxes running into millions of shillings was detected by the 
Commission. Kenya Ports Authority in which KACC Preventive services officers on routine systems examination at the 
MombasaPort detected and reported flawed procurement in progress for two ship-to-shore cranes by KPA at a cost of 
Kshs.1 billion.  
 
Litigation and Asset Recovery 
 
In carrying out its law enforcement mandate, the Commission performed functions towards the litigation and recovery of 
corruptly acquired asset.  Under this function, the Commission investigated the extent of liability for the loss of, or 
damage to any public property and in appropriate cases to institute civil proceedings against any person for the recovery 
of such property or for compensation. The Commission noted that this function underscored the fundamental need to 
deprive the corrupt the benefit of their ill-gotten wealth, thereby removing the motivation to engage in corruption and 
economic crimes generally. (KACC, 20008:11). 
Investigations undertaken by the Commission (KACC, 20008:11) were geared towards, among other things, the 
tracing, freezing, recovery and/or forfeiture of corruptly acquired wealth. These processes, as observed above, served to 
deprive the motivation invariably underlying every corrupt transaction and break the corruption vicious cycle. The 
Commission maintained that effective implementation of these recovery processes is one of the criteria by which status of 
compliance by states parties which are signatory to the United Nation Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and 
African Union Convention for Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC) are evaluated (KACC, 20008:11). 
 
11. Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission’s Corruption Prevention Initiatives 
 
Having identified areas that seem to have rampant cases of corruption, and vested with the institutional mandate to 
prevent corruption in the country, KACC endeavoured several efforts. These were: Partnerships and Coalitions, Review 
of Standard Tender Documents, Enhancing Good Governance in Local Authorities Procurement Systems, Management 
of Records in Public Institutions, Corruption Eradication Indicators for Performance Contracts, Integrity Awards Scheme, 
Enhancing Governance and Integrity in Private Sector/Professional Associations, Integrity Assurance Officers (IAO) 
Training Programme, Corruption Prevention Committees (CPC) and Senior Management Training, Follow-Up on Integrity 
Assurance Officers, Examination and Corruption Prevention Guidelines, Follow-up on the Implementation of 
Recommendations of the Examination Report on the Registration and Licensing of Motor Vehicles and Enforcement of 
Traffic Laws and the development of Corruption Prevention Guidelines (KACC,2008). According to KACC Annual Report 
2007/2008, the Commission partnered and developed coalition activities mainly in public procurement; management of 
records in public institutions; development of governance instruments to support performance contracting, formulation of 
a template for use by public institutions to monitor the  corruption eradication indicators under the performance contracts; 
development of the Public Service Integrity Award Scheme; and enhancing good governance and integrity among private 
sector/professional associations. 
 
Review of Standard Tender Documents 
 
The Commission collaborated with the Pubic Procurement and Oversight Authority (PPOA) to review the standard tender 
documents which provide the framework and the basis for procurement in public institutions. According to KACC (2008), 
there are 39 prescribed Standard Tender Documents. The exercise addressed loopholes exploited for corrupt practices 
and devises safeguards to reduce opportunities for corruption; and integrating anti-corruption conditions in the 
documents. Specific suggestions included Instructions to Bidders: General Conditions of Contract: Selection of 
Consultants: Selection of Individual Professional Consultants: Procurement of Works: Prequalification Document:  
Confidential Business Questionnaire Form (CBQ): Anti-Corruption Declaration/ Commitment/ Pledge Form:  
 
Enhancing Good Governance in Local Authorities Procurement Systems 
 
In its endeavours to prevent corruption, KACC launched Enhancing Good Governance in Local Authorities Procurement 
Systems. The Commission, the Public Procurement Oversight Authority, and other stakeholders implemented the 
programme targeting chief officers and members of Tender Committees in Local Authorities. Phase one of the 
programme exposed participants to the requirements of The Public Procurement and Disposal Act (PPDA) 2005, The 
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Public Procurement and Disposal Regulations (PPDR) 2006, and how to address corruption loopholes in the procurement 
cycle. A practical module guided participants on the design and process of Corruption Risk Assessment (CRA) and 
consequent formulation of Corruption Prevention Plans (CPP) to address identified risks. 170 chief officers and members 
of tender committees from Local Authorities from 5 provinces were trained.  
 
Management of Records in Public Institutions 
 
KACC (2006) observed that proper records are critical in enhancing service delivery and good governance in any 
institution. To help in streamlining records creation, tracking, control and maintenance in public institutions KACC 
collaborated with the Kenya National Archives and Documentation Services in the following activities: 
 
Corruption Eradication Indicators for Performance Contracts 
 
The Commission collaborated with the Office of the Prime Minister-Public Sector Reforms and Performance Contracting 
to develop measurable components of the “Corruption Eradication” indicators which were incorporated in the 
Performance Contracts (PC) of all public institutions in 2007/08. The five performance targets for the “Corruption 
Eradication” indicator were reviewed for incorporation into the performance contracts for 2008/09 for Ministries, State-
Corporations, Local Authorities and Tertiary Institutions. Two components were added for implementation in the year 
2008/09. A reporting template for use by public institutions to monitor implementation indicators was developed for 
quarterly and annual reporting.  
 
Integrity Awards Scheme 
 
The Integrity Award Scheme was launched in 2007, and an adjudication committee comprising representatives from the 
Cabinet Office, Ministry of State for Public Service, Office of the Prime Minister-Public Sector Reforms and Performance 
Contracting, the State Corporations Advisory Committee and the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission was formed. The 
Scheme sets standards for anti-corruption management systems. It was an opportunity for organizations to review their 
positions on corruption and identify further actions to minimize corruption risks.  
 
Enhancing Governance and Integrity in Private Sector/Professional Associations 
 
The Commission, in collaboration with the Association of Professional Societies of East Africa (APSEA) started outreach 
activities to enhance ethics and good corporate governance among professionals and the private sector as a corruption 
prevention strategy (KACC, 2007). The Commission continued to undertake the training of Integrity Assurance Officers 
and Integrity/Corruption Prevention Committees. Other related activities involved follow up in two institutions to determine 
the efficacy of the programme. 
 
Integrity Assurance Officers (IAO) Training Programme 
 
KACC trained a total of 488 Integrity Assurance Officers (IAOs) drawn from various sectors in the public service. A follow-
up was conducted in Kenya Ports Authority and Kenya Wildlife Services to identify gaps that required intervention in the 
IAO training programme and to determine the impact of the IAOs in their organizations. It was observed that some top 
level managers in these institutions were not committed to the implementation of integrity initiatives. In the two institutions 
visited the Corruption Prevention Committees (CPCs) were not properly constituted and there was no evidence that any 
meetings took place. The IAOs trained expressed frustration due to inadequate management support and commitment to 
their work. Anti corruption policy, codes of conduct and corruption prevention plans were yet to be developed.  
This follow-up assisted in mainstreaming anti-corruption strategies in organizations. Training of top managers and 
Corruption Prevention Committee (CPC) members enhanced appreciation of their obligations for corruption prevention 
and the need to own and drive the process. According to KACC (2008), many organizations were now setting aside 
finance and other resources to mainstream integrity through training and development of governance instruments in their 
respective organizations. These instruments included Corruption Prevention Plans (CPP) which profile corruption 
prevention initiatives in public organizations and set out levels of responsibility for implementation of the Plans thereby 
enhancing accountability. 
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Corruption Prevention Committees (CPC) and Senior Management Training 
 
According to KACC (2008), this training targeted senior management and members of the Corruption Prevention 
Committees. The objective of this training was to equip senior managers and their Committees on process of 
mainstreaming anti-corruption strategies through the development of appropriate policies and structures and to 
complement the work of Integrity Assurance Officers.  
 
Examination and Corruption Prevention Guidelines 
 
As the KACC 2007/2008 Annual Report shows, the Commission, in accordance with its mandate, conducted examination 
of systems, policies, procedures and practices in the public and private sector agencies. The Commission also provided 
advisory services to various organizations on various corruption prevention methods. The Commission conducted 
examination of systems relating to procurement, storage and distribution of drugs and medical supplies; Registration and 
Licensing of Motor Vehicles and Enforcement of Traffic Laws; Municipal Council of Mombasa; Ministry of Immigration and 
Registration of Persons - Department of Immigration; the City Council of Nairobi; the Teacher Service Commission; the 
Roads Sub Sector and the Department of Pensions. Recommendations of these examinations are now being 
implemented. Key recommendations from KACC (2008) to curb the above loopholes include, among others, development 
of a national integrated policy on registration of persons, review of The Registration of Persons Act and its Subsidiary 
Legislation and the introduction of tamper proof birth certificates and identity cards. 
 
12. KACC’S Education Initiatives to Fight Corruption 
 
In underscoring education as key avenue in the fight against corruption, KACC developed two main initiatives: Public 
Education Initiative and Sectoral Integrity Education. 
 
Public Education Initiative  
 
The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act 2003 (GK, 2004) empowered KACC to educate members of the public on 
the dangers of corruption and economic crime and to enlist and foster public support in combating corruption and 
economic crime. Education is central in inculcating desired knowledge, skills and values that promote national cohesion, 
development and positive culture. Corruption frustrates efforts to achieve these noble goals. In response, the 
Commission designs, develops and implements education programmes that cover training on anti-corruption, good 
governance, ethics and integrity in the public, private and formal spheres (KACC, 2008:63). The Commission has 
therefore, came with various education programmes that included Media Education Programming, Community Based 
Anti-Corruption Programme  Young Farmers Clubs of Kenya, National and International Days CommemorationsFormal 
Integrity Education, School Based Anti-corruption Curriculum Support Materials Development, End-Term Evaluation of 
the Training, Research, Advocacy and Governance (TRAG) Certificate Course,  Mainstreaming Anti-Corruption and 
Integrity Content in Co-curricula Activities, Governance Training for the Ministry of Education Officers and Schools/ 
Colleges Visits and Opportunity Lectures. 
 
Sectoral Integrity Education 
 
The Commission engaged in a series of sectoral integrity education, among them, Spiritual Sector Anti-Corruption 
Education, Law Enforcement Agencies Anti-Corruption/Integrity Education and Curriculum Development, Kenya Institute 
of Administration (KIA) Trainers Lectures, The Cooperative Sector Integrity and Anti-Corruption Training, Community 
Based Organization (CBO) Anti-Corruption Project and Public Service Integrity Programme (PSIP). The Commission has 
accordingly developed several approaches, namely; Spiritual Sector Anti-Corruption Education, Law Enforcement 
Agencies Anti-Corruption/Integrity Education and Curriculum Development, Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA) 
Trainers Lectures, The Cooperative Sector Integrity and Anti-Corruption Training, Community Based Organization (CBO) 
Anti-Corruption Project and Public Service Integrity Programme (PSIP) 
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13. A Critique of the Defunct Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission’s Initiatives in the Fight against Corruption 
 
Before embarking on a discussion with regard to the challenges that face the defunct KACC in its initiatives to combat 
corruption in Kenya, an exploration of its successes is done. 
 
Successes of the Commission in the Fight against Corruption 
 
KACC made several initiatives in pursuance of its mandate and functions that resulted in several successes. These are 
discussed below. 
 
Law Enforcement 
 
a) Public Involvement and Co-operation 
 
The Commission gained public enthusiasm in reporting perceived cases of corruption. This made it easier for the 
Commission to conduct investigations and law enforcement processes as the public come out not only to report, but also 
to volunteer giving evidence. This hence shows that the Commission continued to gain public cooperation and support in 
combating corruption. This shows that the Commission succeeded in making the public aware of the dangers of 
corruption and the need to fight it. 
 
b) Support from other Government Sectors 
 
Government Ministries, Parastatals and other public institutions co-operated with Commission by incorporating KACC’s 
guidelines to fight corruption. For instance, public institutions established Corruption Prevention Committees, trained 
Integrity Assurance Officers, raised signs and posters warning against corruption, developed Service Charters and 
developed rules and regulations to govern against corrupt practices. 
 
c) Parliamentary Support. 
 
The Kenya Parliament passed necessary legislations that empowered KACC to pursue and perform its mandate and 
functions. Besides, Parliament also enacted other legislations that created institutions that compliment the fight against 
corruption. This means that KACC’s initiatives won the confidence of parliament.  
 
d) Civil Society Support 
 
The Civil societies, both local and international showed support for KACC’s initiatives in the fight against. The civil 
societies were instrumental in evaluating the performance of the Commission and pointing out its failures as well as areas 
that needed attention. The civil societies remained instrumental in supporting anti-corruption campaigns. 
 
Investigations and Asset Tracing 
 
In performing this function, the Commission enjoyed public, parliamentary and international support. 
 
a) Public Support 
 
The Commission succeeded in having members of the public come out to report perceived cases of corruption. This 
enabled the Commission to start investigations and or asset tracing.  
 
b) Parliament 
 
Parliament passed the Witness Protection Act that enables KACC to protect individuals who volunteered information that 
may be useful while carrying out investigations or tracing assets. 
c) International Support 
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The United Nations, African Union and other related international organizations developed conventions that call for the 
independence of KACC. The diplomatic community remained committed to denying visas to those suspected of corrupt 
practices. Foreign governments started freezing accounts of those suspected of corruption and some were in the process 
of having extradition agreements with Government of Kenya. This enabled KACC to carry its investigations and asset 
tracing function.  
 
Public Education 
 
Through pubic education, KACC created awareness of the effects of corruption, the need to eradicate and report it when 
suspected cases occur. In this way, the Commission achieved great success. 
 
a) Schools 
 
Schools joined the fight against corruption through the teaching of moral education as integrated in the syllabus. The 
schools also incorporated anti-corruption campaigns in co-curricular activities such music and drama. The fusion of anti-
corruption themes in literature texts is another indicator of the support that the Commission enjoyed from schools. 
 
b) Community Based Organizations 
 
Members of community based organizations supported KACC’s initiative in enhancing awareness about corruption 
through music and during public functions. This strengthened anti-corruption campaigns, thereby showing that KACC 
succeeded in winning community support. 
 
c) Mass Media 
 
Both print and electronic media remained paramount in anti-corruption campaigns. News reporters continued to report on 
cases of alleged corruption. Further, they carried out anti-corruption messages and advertisements and continued to 
condemn corruption. The media remained vigilant in reporting corrupt practices. The Commission also succeeded in 
having the media create awareness of its establishment and mandate and gave coverage its works. 
 
Challenges that KACC Faced in its Anti-Corruption Initiatives 
 
Several challenges continue to undermine the initiatives of the KACC, despite the successes it made. These challenges 
could be grouped into two broad categories: legal and operational challenges. 
 
Legal Challenges 
 
Some of the legal challenges that KACC faced were the definition of corruption by the Act, Poor conception of the 
meaning of corruption and Limited KACC’s Mandate with Regard to Law Enforcement 
 
a) The definition of corruption by the Act  
 
The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 (the Anti-Corruption Act) defined corruption as an offence with 
respect to a benefit that is an inducement or reward for, or otherwise on account of, an agent - doing or not doing 
something in relation to the affairs or business of the agent’s principal; or showing or not showing favour or disfavour to 
anything, including to any person or proposal, in relation to the affairs or business of the agent’s principal, bribery, fraud, 
embezzlement or misappropriation of public funds, abuse of office, breach of trust; or an offence involving dishonesty- in 
connection with any tax, rate or impost levied under any Act; or under any written law relating to the elections of persons 
to public office; (The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003). The Anti-Corruption Act did not adequately 
address many of the offences created under UNCAC, e.g. bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public 
international organizations, illicit enrichment, laundering of the proceeds of crime, trading in influence and obstruction of 
justice. This way, the Commission did not provide for the holistic criminalization of corruption.  
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The Anti-Corruption Act did not have provisions to criminalize corruption in the private sector (Muthomi, 2oo6). The 
Act only committed public officers an implication that corruption does not occur in the private sector. This meant that 
those people who engaged in corrupt activities within the private sector could not be disciplined by KACC. It remained not 
said how KACC would address a case in which for example a human resource officer in a private sector demanded a 
bribe or favours to award a tender or employment to undeserving individuals. 
The definition of corruption by the Act did not distinguish between corruption and economic crime. The latter was 
defined as an offence involving dishonesty under any written law providing for the maintenance or protection of the public 
revenue. It appears from this that not all acts of corruption involve economic crime. Equally, economic crime need not 
always to involve or amount to corruption, as for the most part, the consequences of corruption and economic crime are 
identical. These pitfalls in the definition of corruption undermined KACC’s initiatives in the enforcement of law as provided 
in its mandate. 
 
b) Poor conception of the meaning of corruption 
 
KACC’s Annual Reports show that many of the alleged cases of corruption received from the public did not constitute 
corruption. For example during the period 2003/2004, 3,552 complaints were received. Out of these, KACC instituted 
investigations on 242 complaints. These were the complaints that fell within the KACC’s mandate. The other complaints 
were handed over to the relevant agencies for further action while no action was taken on 229 complaints.  
In the period 2004/2005 (KACC 2004/2005:5), a total of 3,234 complaints of suspected and alleged corruption and 
economic crime were received at the Commission. Of this number, only 384 (11.9%) were found to merit further 
investigation by the Commission under its statutory mandate to address corruption and economic crime.KACC 2005/2006 
reveals that out of 7,888 reports of alleged corruption and economic crime brought to the Commission’s attention by 
Kenyans, during the reporting year, only 15% of them fell within the mandate of the Commission, thereby meriting further 
action by the Commission.  
During the year 2006/7 the Commission received 8,188 complaints, reports and other matters from members of the 
public, public service, and watchdog agencies, as compared to 7,888 in the previous year, reflecting an increase of 300 
reports or 3.8%. There was also an overwhelming increase of anonymous reports owing to the introduction of the Web-
based anonymous reporting system. Anonymous reports increased by 53% from 750 in the previous year to 1,151. Out of 
the reports received during the year, 1,611 were corruption related and were taken up for investigations. This reflected an 
increase of cases taken up for investigation from 15% last year to 20% during the year 2006/7. The Commission took up 
1,611 reports for investigation. Out of these reports, 28% were handled through preliminary investigation, 26% special 
operations, 13% forensic investigation, and 33% were taken for intelligence development. During the year, 237 
investigations were completed while 115 were referred to external agencies for investigation. In addition, the Commission 
carried forward 857 cases from the previous years (KACC, 2007:4f.). 
These observations point to the fact that the public did not have a clear understanding of corruption. As a result, 
the few cases that KACC was able to address, versus the reports received could create a sceptical mood among those 
who report, hence the claim that KACC did not do enough in fighting corruption. 
 
c) Limited KACC’s Mandate with Regard to Law Enforcement 
 
To enable KACC to effectively carry out its law enforcement function, under Section 3 and 4, the Anti-Corruption and 
Economic Act 2003 provided for the appointment of magistrates to try person who commit offences under this Act. 
However, the existence and jurisdiction of special magistrates was challenged in court as was made in the High Court of 
Kenya (Nairobi) Miscellaneous Criminal Application No. 495 of 2003 in which it was stated that the court, had no 
relationship with the Anti-Corruption Act and therefore it was untenable for the applicant to impugn the Act. It becomes a 
concern on what the real role of the court was with regard to the mandate of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission. 
Provisions of Part II of the Anti-Corruption Act related to the procedures and powers of special magistrates in which 
it was provided that a special magistrate may, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have 
been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence, tender a pardon to such person-on condition of his making 
a full and true disclosure of the whole circumstance within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person 
concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission of the offence. Such pardon, when so tendered, is deemed 
a pardon for purposes of section 77(6) of the by then Constitution of Kenya. It emerges here that the Commission could 
not have effectively carried out its mandate given this seeming discrepancy. 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
        Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
            Published by MCSER-CEMAS-Sapienza University of Rome 
Vol 4 No 2 
May 2013 
 
 500 
Section 5 of the Anti-Corruption Act accorded with the provisions of Article 37 of UNCAC, which obliges State 
Parties to take appropriate measures to encourage persons who participate in or who have participated in the 
commission of an offence established under the Convention to supply information useful to competent authorities for 
investigative and evidentiary purposes and to provide factual, specific help to competent authorities that may contribute to 
depriving offenders of the proceeds of crime and to recovering such proceeds. Section 5 of the Act provided that a 
special Magistrate may, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly 
concerned in, or privy to, an offence, tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure 
of the whole circumstance within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as 
principal or abettor, in the commission thereof and any pardon so tendered shall be a pardon for purposes of section 
77(6) of the Constitution ( The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003: 8) 
According to the by then Kenya Constitution, Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual 
was contained in Chapter Five and had sixteen sections that ranged from section 70 to section 86. Section 77 had 
provisions to secure protection of law. It was a section which provided that every person who was charged with a criminal 
offence shall be presumed to be innocent until proved or pleaded guilty (Kenya, Republic of, 1992). Section 77(6) stated 
that no person shall be tried for a criminal offence if he shows 'that he has been pardoned for that offence (Kenya, 
Republic of, 1992). 
In particular, the pardon provided by section 5 of the Anti-Corruption Act accorded with the requirement for State 
Parties to consider the possibility of granting immunity from prosecution to a person who provides substantial cooperation 
in the investigation or prosecution of an offence established in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. It states 
that each State Party shall  take appropriate measures to encourage persons who participate or who have participated in 
the commission of an offence established in accordance with this Convention to supply information useful to competent 
authorities for investigative and evidentiary purposes and to provide factual, specific help to competent authorities that 
may contribute to depriving offenders of the proceeds of crime and to recovering such proceeds  consider providing for 
the possibility, in appropriate cases, of mitigating punishment of an accused person who provides substantial cooperation 
in the investigation or prosecution of an offence consider providing for the possibility, in accordance with fundamental 
principles of its domestic law, of granting immunity from prosecution to a person who provides substantial cooperation in 
the investigation or prosecution of an offence established in accordance with this Convention.(UN, 2004: 27). This 
seeming conflict of the legal provisions raises questions on the efficacy of the Commission when it carried out 
investigations and collection of evidence. 
 
Operational Challenges  
 
a) Operational Parameters 
 
The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 lacked many of the significant features and obligations imposed on 
State Parties under UNCAC. It did not, for instance, make sufficient provision for international cooperation and technical 
assistance in the prevention of and fight against corruption, yet Kenya is a signatory to UNCAC. Section 12(2) of the Anti-
Corruption Act states that the Commission may in the performance of its functions work in co-operation with any foreign 
government or international regional organization (The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003).  This provision 
by the Act was only a minimal provision on international co-operation, the Act did not provide for the mode and scope of 
international cooperation. Further, since the Act did not address trans-boundary aspects of corruption, it can legitimately 
be argued that the cooperation envisioned under the Act only related to matters touching on corruption or economic 
crimes committed in Kenya. In fact, section 67 of the Act which stated that conduct by a citizen of Kenya that takes place 
outside Kenya constitutes an offence under this Act if the conduct would constitute an offence under this Act if it took 
place in Kenya(The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003).  
The implication of the above observation is that the Act only criminalized extra-territorial offences committed by 
Kenyan citizens. In the absence of a local law domesticating the provisions of UNCAC, it is legitimate to argue that Kenya 
had no legal sanctions against transnational aspects of corruption. Consequently, KACC had no mandate on the offences 
being committed under these circumstances. It is therefore evident that KACC and its initiatives were limited to the people 
of Kenya.  
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b) Co-ordination and Harmonization 
 
The fact that the Anti-Corruption Act limited KACC to investigations without prosecutorial powers was a major 
shortcoming of the Act. It is noted that KACC “lacked the teeth” to bite corrupt officials. This was because the Attorney 
General could decide not to prosecute individuals even after investigations by KACC. 
It is arguable that the establishment of KACC under the Anti-Corruption Act did not fully meet Kenya’s obligations 
under Articles 5 and 6 of UNCAC. Article 5 of UNCAC obliges State Parties to develop and implement or maintain 
effective, coordinated anti-corruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the rule of law, proper 
management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability. Article 5 of UNCAC states 
that Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, develop and implement or 
maintain effective, coordinated anti-corruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the principles 
of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability to 
establish and promote effective practices aimed at the prevention of corruption endeavour to periodically evaluate 
relevant legal instruments and administrative measures with a view to determining their adequacy to prevent and fight 
corruption  as appropriate and in accordance with the fundamental principles of their legal system, collaborate with each 
other and with relevant international and regional organizations in promoting and developing the measures referred to in 
this article. That collaboration may include participation in international programmes and projects aimed at the prevention 
of corruption (UN, 2004:9). 
It appears that there was no coordination in implementing anti-corruption measures and policies. Though section 
12 of the Anti-Corruption Act provided for cooperation between KACC and other bodies, for instance, it was witnessed 
conflicts between KACC and the office of the Attorney General. Though section 12 obliged public bodies and officers to 
cooperate with KACC, it should be contrasted with multiple constitutional and statutory provisions which provided that 
certain officers and bodies were not subject to the control and direction of any person or authority. KACC’s success 
seemed to be dictated by the Attorney General’s office as it decided on which cases to be prosecuted. 
Still on coordination and harmonization of anti-corruption measures and policies, it is not clear whether officers of 
the Anti-Corruption Unit of the Kenya Police Force were answerable to the by then Commissioner of Police or Director of 
KACC. In short, the provisions of section 12 of the Anti-Corruption Act fall below the requirement set out in Article 38 of 
UNCAC. Under Article 38, each State Party is obliged to take such measures as may be necessary to encourage 
cooperation between its public officials and authorities on the one hand and its authorities responsible for investigating 
and prosecuting criminal offences under the Convention. There are no known measures in Kenya, legal, policy or 
administrative, obliging public authorities and officials to assist and cooperate with KACC. 
 
c) Challenges facing the Investigations Initiative 
 
The Commission faced several criticism over the manner in which it executed its mandate as provided by the Act. In fact 
the Commission admitted this in its 2006/2007 Annual Report. The Commission stated that weaknesses in the anti-
corruption legislation, including the lack of transparency in wealth declarations, lack of a mechanism of investigating 
breaches of codes of conduct and ethics by public officers undermined its work (KACC, 2007: 5). The Commission 
pointed out that the recovery of looted public property was not possible because of The Limitation of Actions Act (Cap. 
22).  According to this Act, the time limits for actions based on breach of contract, breach of trust and unjust enrichment 
was six years, while for actions based on tort such as theft or fraud it was three years. This meant that most of the 
misappropriated public funds could not be recovered unless the Act was amended to remove these limits.  
 
d) Lack of Anti-Corruption Education Programmes 
 
The initiative by KACC towards anti-corruption education met the requirements of Article 6(1) (b) of UNCAC, which 
obliges State Parties to ensure the existence of a body or bodies to increase and disseminate knowledge about the 
prevention of corruption as part of preventive measures. Article 6(1) (b) of UNCAC provides that each State Party shall, in 
accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, ensure the existence of a body or bodies, as appropriate 
that prevent corruption by such means as increasing and disseminating knowledge about the prevention of corruption 
(UN, 2004:10). However it is noted that KACC lacked a clear curriculum, trained teachers and teaching methodology. 
Though the Commission tried to examine learners on the knowledge of anti-corruption education, it is regretted that such 
evaluation attempt was not defined nor articulated.  
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The Commission did not articulate the goals of its public education initiatives and neither did it necessarily draw the 
objectives. Consequently, this undermined the drawing of curriculum content. It further undermined the logical structure of 
such content to meet the learning needs and levels of consumers (learners).  
The use of co-curricular presents another challenge in that whereas corruption causes such devastating effects on 
mankind, the use of forums such music and drama paints a picture of people celebrating in their own jubilation. On many 
occasions one would see students dancing and celebrating that they have won the trophy and the accompanying joy of 
victory. Furthermore, composers may be making efforts in their work, not because they want to spread the message of 
anti-corruption, but to win the trophy and the fame that comes with such victory.  
The absence pedagogical provisions, KACC’s educational initiatives did not have lesson plans. Lessons were not 
planned or were they schemed. Ideally, what seems to have happened is that these public educational programmes were 
playing entertainment role rather educational. For example, when a school presented a dramatized dance it is not clear 
whether the audience came for the message on corruption or came for love of drama and therefore entrainment. The 
same thing applies to music. Furthermore, a team that scores a highest mark in drama or music does not really imply that 
the team convinced many people to change their corruptive behaviour. It is because the team applied the rules of drama 
or music correctly, as the final score is based on such aspects. 
Raising of consciousness about the norms and ethics of the profession may contribute to increasing job 
satisfaction among teachers and education personnel, to enhancing their status and self-esteem, and to increasing 
respect for the profession in society Education personnel shall: a) justify public trust and confidence and enhance the 
esteem in which the profession is held by providing quality education for all students; b) ensure that professional 
knowledge is regularly updated and improved; c) determine the nature, format and timing of their lifelong learning 
programs as an essential expression of their professionalism;  d) declare all relevant information related to competency 
and qualifications; e) strive, through active participation in their union, to achieve conditions of work that attract highly 
qualified persons to the profession; f) support all efforts to promote democracy and human rights in and through 
education (EI Declaration on Professional Ethics, Section 9). Besides the failure to provide for the professional 
qualification of those involved in the practice of public education, KACC did not provide for the ethical conduct as 
contained in the declaration. 
 
14. Conclusion 
 
In seeing corruption as amoebic in nature (that is, without a definite form), this paper has shown that it occurs in various 
forms and a wide range of places such that there seems to be no single approach to its eradication. Using reflections 
from the defunct Kenya Anti-corruption Commission, it has been further shown that corrupt individuals exploit existing 
gaps in legislation to evade justice, a condition created by the very fluid nature of corruption in which it rests on varying 
interpretation. This way, this paper concludes that anti-corruption initiatives should be conceived in a dynamic manner 
that could be applicable in times when corruption changes faces. From the discussion in this paper, it is further concluded 
that: 
a) Corruption has devastating effects of human beings. Corruption is increasingly seen as a serious crime with 
devastating consequences such as wasteful spending, bigger budgetary deficits, great economic inequalities, 
disinvestments as well as unorthodox trading practices. It continues to undermine good governance and to 
distort public policy, leading to misallocation of resources. 
b) The devastating effects of corruption are the driving forces in anti-corruption initiatives. 
c) With regard to the fight against corruption, education is central in inculcating desired knowledge, skills and 
values and its use in combating corruption should focus on the will to know how to act. 
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